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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree with the statement of jurisdiction set 
forth in the Brief of Appellant, 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing 
sanctions upon appellant Brian M. Barnard (Barnard) under Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to make a 
reasonable inquiry into the law before filing his verified 
complaint against appellees? 
Standard of Appellate Review 
An appellate court should use an abuse-of-discretion 
standard in reviewing all aspects of a lower court's 
determination of a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp.r 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990), applying that standard on 
review of a district court award of sanctions under the 
substantially similar federal Rule 11. Accord. Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor. 770 P. 2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(If[W]e will affirm the particular [Rule 11] sanction imposed 
by the trial court, including the reasonableness of any fee 
award, absent an abuse of discretion.11). Judicial discretion 
is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
1 
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion 
is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view 
adopted by the trial court. Ruebke v. Globe Communications 
Corp. , 738 P.2d 1246, 1254 (Kan. 1987). Accord. In Re 
Marriage of Pilant. 709 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) 
("Abuse of discretion does not exist unless it can be held 
that no reasonable person would have ruled as the trial court 
did on the facts before it.11) 
III. DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides as follows: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at 
least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of 
Utah. The attorney's address also shall be stated. 
A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state 
his address. Except when otherwise specifically 
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be 
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in 
equity that the averments of an answer under oath 
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses 
or of one witness sustained by corroborating 
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him 
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other 
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
2 
of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it 
is signed promptly after the omission is called to 
the attention of the pleader or movant. If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, 
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order 
to pay to the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the Third 
District awarding appellees their attorney's fees against 
Barnard as a sanction under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for Barnard's failure to make a reasonable inquiry 
into the law before filing his verified complaint against 
appellees. 
Course of Proceedings 
Shortly after appellees filed a motion to dismiss 
Barnard's verified complaint and a memorandum supporting that 
motion, Barnard voluntarily dismissed his verified complaint 
pursuant to Rule 41(a) (l)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Following Barnard's voluntary dismissal, appellees 
filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. section 78-27-56. 
3 
Disposition in Court Below 
The district court denied appellees' motion based on Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-27-56. The court likewise rejected 
appellees' argument under Rule 11 that Barnard had failed to 
make a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing his 
verified complaint or that his complaint was filed for an 
improper purpose. The court found, however, that Barnard had 
failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the law before filing 
his verified complaint and granted appellees' motion for 
sanctions under Rule 11 on that basis, awarding appellees 
their attorney's fees as a sanction against Barnard. 
Statement of Facts 
1. August 2, 1989, approximately 10:15 a.m. — Barnard 
and appellee Toni M. Sutliff (Sutliff) had a telephone 
conversation concerning a pending disciplinary action against 
Barnard which Sutliff, as Associate Bar Counsel, had been 
assigned to handle for the Office of Bar Counsel. Prior 
correspondence from Sutliff to Barnard had indicated that the 
disciplinary matter would be set for review by a screening 
panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State 
Bar. Barnard telephoned Sutliff to request the names of the 
4 
screening panel members to which his case had been assigned 
(Record (hereafter "R."), at pp. 3, 49-52). 
2. August 2, 1989, 3:07 p.m. — Less than five hours 
after the conversation between Sutliff and Barnard, Sutliff 
was served with a copy of Barnard's five-page verified 
complaint (R., at pp. 8, 49-52). The complaint sought, among 
other things, to prohibit appellees from moving forward on the 
disciplinary action against Barnard until such time as they 
reveal to Barnard the names of the members of the screening 
panel to which his matter would be assigned (R., at pp. 2-6). 
3. September 8, 1989 — Appellees filed a memorandum in 
support of their previously-filed motion to dismiss Barnard's 
verified complaint (R., at pp. 10-12, 24-34). 
4. September 11, 1989 — Barnard filed a voluntary 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l)(i) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (R., at pp. 59-65). 
5. October 13, 1989 — Barnard separately filed in this 
Court a verified petition seeking the issuance of an 
extraordinary writ. The petition sought, among other things, 
to prohibit Bar Counsel and the screening panel from moving 
forward on the pending disciplinary matter against Barnard. 
In the petition, Barnard stated under oath that the Supreme 
Court has "the exclusive jurisdiction to discipline attorneys; 
5 
therefore, this action could not be filed in District Court" 
(R., pp. 241-252). 
6. January 10, 1990 — Appellees filed a motion for, 
among other things, sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Among other things, appellees 
argued that Barnard had failed to make a reasonable inquiry 
into the law, as required by Rule 11, prior to filing his 
verified complaint. Two full pages of appellees7 memorandum 
supporting their motion for Rule 11 sanctions were devoted to 
the argument that Barnard had not made a reasonable inquiry 
into the law before filing his complaint (R. , at pp. 218-254). 
7. January 19, 1990 — Barnard file>d a 12-page response 
to appellees' motion for sanctions and also filed an 8-page 
affidavit executed by himself (R., at pp. 260-280). In that 
affidavit, Barnard stated in part as follows: 
13. (a) I filed this action in good faith and 
based upon the clear and direct refusal of Toni 
Marie Sutliff to reveal to me that [sic] names of 
the Screening Panel members even after the matter 
was assigned to a panel. 
(b) I believed upon filing this action 
and believe now that I am entitled to know the 
names of the members of an assigned Screening Panel 
sufficiently in advance of the hearing to seek 
recusal and/or if appropriate, commence legal 
action against them. 
14. I filed this action to protect my 
interests and rights in a disciplinary action 
pending before the Utah State Bar. I did not file 
6 
this action for any improper motive or purpose. At 
the time I filed this action, I honestly believed 
that this action was proper, I continue to so 
believe. But for the filing of this action, I 
believe that the Office of Bar Counsel and Ms. 
Sutliff would not have provided me with the names 
of the Screening Panel members. 
15. My only possible error in this action was 
filing it in this Court [(the district court)] 
rather than as an original petition before the Utah 
Supreme Court. I sought to enlist the aid of the 
broad equitable powers of this court. Such a 
defect (if that it be) is not a violation of Rule 
11 or Utah Code Ann. section 78-27-56 (1953 as 
amended). The relief sought in this action would 
clearly be available from the Utah Supreme Court, 
and merely filing an action in the wrong court is 
not cause for sanctions. 
16. By way of an explanation as to filing in 
this Court [(the district court)], I present the 
following: prior to this suit, I filed two (2) 
other actions against the Utah State Bar in this 
Court: Case No. 88-0578, Judge Homer Wilkinson and 
Case No. 88-0801, Judge Pat Brian. Each of those 
actions involved aspects of the practice of law, 
the licensing of lawyers in Utah, or functioning of 
the Utah State Bar, all issues which appear at 
first blush to be within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Utah Supreme Court. Ut. Const. Art. VIII, 
section 4. In each of those actions, the 
defendants moved to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction and in each case those motions were 
not granted.1 
(R., at pp. 263-264) (emphasis in original). In neither his 
response nor his affidavit did Barnard make any further 
Barnard's statement in paragraph 16 is inaccurate. In the 
two referenced cases, defendants did not make any motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction and there was no ruling on the issue of 
jurisdiction. 
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explanation of his pre-filing inquiry into the law of whether 
the district court had jurisdiction of his action (R., at pp. 
260-280). 
8. February 12, 1990 — The Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, issued a 
memorandum decision ruling that sanctions under Rule 11 were 
appropriate against Barnard and that appellees were entitled 
to their attorney's fees since Barnard had failed to conduct 
a reasonable inquiry into the law prior to filing his verified 
complaint, as required under Rule 11. While resolving the 
issue of appellees' entitlement to sanctions against Barnard, 
the court left open the issue of the cLmount of attorney's 
fees, requested appellees' counsel to submit an affidavit 
setting forth the amount of fees, and allowed Barnard an 
opportunity to object to the amount. (R., at pp. 288-295) 
9. When the district court issued its memorandum 
decision determining appellees' entitlement to sanctions 
against Barnard for his failure to conduct a reasonable 
inquiry into the law, the only materials Barnard had submitted 
to oppose appellees' motion were the response and affidavit 
referred to in paragraph 7 above (R., at pp. 253-295).2 
20n February 26, 1990—after the district court ruled that 
appellees were entitled to sanctions against Barnard—Barnard for 
the first time set forth in a second affidavit the pre-filing legal 
8 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court had reasonable grounds to rule that 
Barnard had failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the 
law of the district court's jurisdiction prior to filing his 
verified complaint. The court did not abuse its discretion in 
imposing sanctions against Barnard under Rule 11 for failing 
to conduct such an inquiry. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST BARNARD 
UNDER RULE 11 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that the signature of an attorney "constitutes a certificate 
by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
research he claims to have conducted concerning the jurisdiction of 
the district court to hear cases relating to disciplinary matters. 
He also filed an objection to the award of attorney's fees, 
essentially requesting the court to reconsider its decision and to 
award appellees no fees. He also filed affidavits from eight other 
Utah lawyers. Pursuant to appellees' motion, the district court 
struck as immaterial all eight attorney affidavits and most of 
Barnard's objection and second affidavit, except those parts 
dealing with the appropriate amount of attorney's fees. (R., at pp. 
309-363, 376-386, 469-472) Accordingly, those materials took no 
part in the district court's determination of appellees' motion for 
sanctions and should likewise be disregarded by this Court. 
9 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law...." The 
rule provides that if a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the couart "shall impose upon 
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction" which may include an order to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee. In this case, the district court 
ruled that Barnard failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into 
the law prior to filing his verified complaint. That ruling 
should be affirmed unless the court abused its discretion. 
As indicated above, the standard of review, when 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is appealed, is whether the 
district court abused its discretion. Moreover, abuse of 
discretion does not exist unless it can be held that no 
reasonable person would have ruled as the trial court did on 
the facts before it. See, Standard of Appellate Review 
section above. Applying that standard to this case leads to 
the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing sanctions against Barnard. 
The incident which prompted Barnard to file his verified 
complaint was the telephone conversation between him and 
Sutliff at approximately 10:15 a.m. on August 2, 1989. Less 
than five hours later, Sutliff was served with Barnard's five-
page verified complaint. In his haste to sue appellees, 
10 
Barnard failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law. 
Had he done so, he would have realized that the district court 
does not have jurisdiction over disciplinary matters and that 
his effort to challenge the propriety of the disciplinary 
procedure should have been initiated in this Court which has 
exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. A little over a 
month after voluntarily dismissing this action, Barnard 
acknowledged the accuracy of that very issue when he filed a 
verified petition in this Court in which he acknowledged under 
oath that the district court does not have jurisdiction over 
disciplinary matters but that exclusive jurisdiction over such 
matters resides in the Supreme Court.3 In responding to 
appellees7 motion for sanctions, Barnard had ample opportunity 
to refute the foregoing evidence of lack of reasonable inquiry 
into the law. He did not, however, submit any evidence 
detailing his pre-filing inquiry into the law. Rather he 
filed a twelve-page response to defendants7 motion for 
3Although the district court did not make a specific ruling on 
the issue of whether the district court has jurisdiction over 
actions involving disciplinary matters, the court's ruling on the 
motion for sanctions implicitly acknowledges the correctness of 
that position. That position is set forth in Defendants7 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed on or about 
September 8, 1989. A copy of that memorandum is attached under tab 
1. The argument set forth therein regarding the district court's 
lack of jurisdiction over actions involving disciplinary matters is 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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sanctions and an eight-page affidavit. The most Barnard 
indicated in his response about any pre-filing inquiry into 
the law were his conclusary statements that he "made a good 
faith inquiry into the law of this action. . .before filing the 
complaint herein" (R. at p. 273) and that he "had good reason 
to believe that this Court [(the district court)] could, would 
and should consider his claims herein for injunctive relief" 
(R. at p. 278). 
Moreover, in his affidavit, Barnard gave no details about 
any pre-filing inquiry into the law but stated as follows: 
My only possible error in this action was 
filing it in this Court [(the district 
court)] rather than as an original 
petition before the Utah Supreme Court. 
I sought to enlist the aid of the broad, 
equitable powers of this court. Such a 
defect (if that it be) is not a violation 
of Rule 11 or Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
(1953 as amended). The relief sought in 
this action would clearly be available 
from the Utah Supreme Court and merely 
filing an action in the wrong court is 
not cause for sanctions. 
R. at pp. 263 and 264. By way of further explanation as to 
his filing this action in the district court, Barnard referred 
to two other actions he had filed against the Bar involving 
12 
"aspects of the practice of law, the licensing of lawyers in 
Utah, or functioning of the Utah State Bar, all issues which 
appear at first blush to be within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Utah Supreme Court" (R. at p. 264). 
At no time before the district court's ruling on 
appellees' motion for sanctions did Barnard ever provide to 
the court any explanation of any pre-filing inquiry into the 
law of the district court jurisdiction. His later 
acknowledgment, in his petition to this Court and his 
affidavit filed in the district court, that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction belies any reasonable pre-filing inquiry. 
Under these circumstances, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that Barnard had made no 
reasonable inquiry into the law prior to filing his verified 
complaint. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 




For the foregoing reasons, appellees Toni M. Sutliff and 
Utah State Bar respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
district court's order and judgment imposing a sanction upon 
Barnard under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
awarding appellees their attorney's fees. 
DATED this v.* day of December, 1990. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P~C. 
?
 • • r- / I 
Carman E. Kipp 
Robert H. Rees 
Attorneys for appellees 
Toni Sutliff 
and Utah State Bar 
14 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 89090W0 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants Toni M. Sutliff (Sutliff) and the Utah 
State Bar (Bar) submit this memorandum in support of their 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's verified complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF«S COMPLAINT MOST BE DISMISSED 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT 
In his verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that he 
is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding being handled by 
Associate Bar Counsel, Sutliff. Plaintiff has alleged that 
-1-
Sutliff, in the course of handling the disciplinary action, 
failed to inform plaintiff of the names of the members of the 
screening panel that will review his matter. 
The disciplinary proceeding referred to in plaintifffs 
verified complaint is governed, as are all such disciplinary 
proceedings, by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
Bar promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court. In Rule XVI of those 
procedures, the Supreme Court has provided as follows: 
All members of the Committee, Board, 
hearing committees, Bar Counsel, 
disciplinary staff and other persons duly 
authorized to act in disciplinary 
proceedings under these rules shall be 
absolutely immune from civil suit...for any 
conduct in the course of their official 
responsibilities. 
It is clear that Sutliff was acting in the course of 
her official responsibilities as Associate Bar Counsel. 
Pursuant to the rule cited above, she is absolutely immune from 
civil suit. Since Sutliff is immune from suit, plaintiff can 
maintain no action against Sutliff or the Bar. Plaintifffs 
complaint should, therefore, be dismissed. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO 
GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF 
Plaintifffs verified complaint requests this court to 
K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN. PC. 
ATTOWNCTS AT LAW 
CITY CCNTftC Z. #330 
178 CAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
S A L T LAKC C ITY , 
UTAH 84111-231* 
(SOI) 5113773 
grant a preliminary and permanent injunction against defendants 
with respect to the disciplinary proceeding against plaintiff. 
As discussed below, however, plaintiff has requested relief 
which, if granted, would require this court to delve into an 
area which is exclusively within the province of the Utah 
Supreme Court and which would in essence require this court to 
enjoin the Utah Supreme Court. This court does not have 
jurisdiction of matters relating to attorney discipline or to 
enjoin the Supreme Court and should dismiss plaintifffs verified 
complaint. 
Prior to July 1985, the power to regulate the practice 
of law was inherent in the judicial power conferred on the Utah 
Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah 
Constition. In re Disciplinary Action of George McCune, 717 
P.2d 701, 704 (Ut&h 1986). That power was made explicit in 1985 
when Article VIII, Section 4 was amended. That section, as 
amended, provides in relevant part that the Supreme Court "shall 
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law." Thus, the authority to discipline persons admitted to 
practice law in Utah resides exclusively in the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
While attorney discipline is exclusively within its 
province, the Utah Supreme Court has delegated to the Bar many 
of the functions involved in attorney discipline proceedings. 
Indeed, one of the purposes for the "perpetuat[ion], creat[ion], 
and continuation]" of the Bar "under the direction and control" 
of the Utah Supreme Court is "to provide for the regulation and 
discipline of persons engaged in the practice of law." Rules 
for Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar, 
Rule(A)1. In handling disciplinary proceedings, the Bar acts 
for and as an extension of the Utah Supreme Court. The ultimate 
authority in all disciplinary matters, however, resides with the 
Supreme Court. 
Since the Supreme Court retains exclusive authority 
and jurisdiction in all disciplinary matters, any action by a 
lower court relating to disciplinary matters would be 
inappropriate as outside that court's jurisdiction. Moreover, 
any injunction against the Bar relating to a disciplinary matter 
where the Bar acts as an arm of the Utah Supreme Court would, in 
essence, be an injunction against the Supreme Court. A district 
court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin the Supreme Court, 
the highest court in the state. 
These conclusions are supported by the recent case 
from the Appellate Court of Illinois. In Ettinger v. Rolewick, 
488 N.E.2d 598 (111. App. 1986), plaintiff was the subject of an 
investigation by the Illinois Attorney Registration and 
Disciplinary Commission (Commission) and its administrator 
concerning possible violations of the Illinois Code of 
Professional Responsibility. The Commission is the agency 
established by the Illinois Supreme Court to supervise the 
registration and disciplinary proceedings affecting members of 
the Illinois Bar. Plaintiff, an Illinois attorney, filed a 
complaint against the Commission and its administrator seeking 
to enjoin them from utilizing in the disciplinary proceeding the 
transcript of plaintiff's testimony in a federal court criminal 
case. The Appellate Court of Illinois considered whether the 
lower court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's complaint 
for an injunction. In concluding that the inherent nature of an 
attorney discipline proceeding precludes the circuit court from 
asserting jurisdiction in the case, the court stated as follows: 
The power to regulate and define the 
practice of law in this State is the 
prerogative of the Illinois Supreme 
Court.... The Illinois Supreme Court has 
never deviated from the rule that it has 
original and inherent jurisdiction to 
regulate the practice of law.... 
[I]t would be presumptuous of any court to 
exercise jurisdiction unless specifically 
directed to do so by the Illinois Supreme 
Court as its agent. 
Id. at pp. 601 and 602. 
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Similarly, in this action, plaintiff has requested 
this court to intercede in a pending disciplinary proceeding 
which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme 
Court. This court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief relating 
to a pending disciplinary matter unless pursuant to a clear 
directive from the Utah Supreme Court. There being no such 
directive, this court should dismiss plaintiff's complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT BEEN 
DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 
In his verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that 
defendants1 refusal to provide him with the names of the 
screening panel members constitutes a denial of due process 
(Verified Complaint K10) and that defendants are engaging in 
improper "forum shopping" (Verified Complaint, 1113). 
Plaintiffs1 allegations are nothing short of ludicrous. 
The constitutions of both the United States and of 
Utah contain similar due process clauses. Although plaintiff 
has not specified whether he seeks relief under the federal or 
state constitution, the lack of any reference in the verified 
complaint to any federal statutory authority for plaintiffs1 
action presumably indicates that plaintiff seeks relief under 
<IPP AND CHRISTIAN, PC. - 6 -
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the Utah constitutional provision. That provision is found in 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah, which provides 
as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Plaintiff1s complaint does not allege any deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property but merely alleges a deprivation 
of due process. The concept of due process does not operate in 
a vacuum. A claim that a personfs rights under Article I, 
Section 7 have been violated has no meaning unless there has 
been a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. In this 
action, plaintiff has alleged and has suffered no deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property. All that plaintiff has alleged is 
that defendants have failed to inform him of the names of the 
members of the screening panel assigned to hear his case. That 
is not a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and 
plaintiff's complaint must fail on that basis alone. 
Even if plaintifffs complaint did properly allege a 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law, it would nevertheless be without merit. The facts of this 
case simply do not support the claim that plaintiff has been 
deprived of due process of law. 
The accompanying affidavits of Toni M. Sutliff and 
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Christine A. Burdick set forth in some detail the procedure used 
generally by the Office of Bar Counsel in processing complaints 
against attorneys for alleged ethical violations, and in 
particular the procedure followed in processing the complaint 
against plaintiff. That procedure is pursuant to the authority 
granted Bar Counsel by the Utah Supreme Court in the Procedures 
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. Those Procedures provide 
that Bar Counsel is authorized and directed to conduct a 
preliminary investigation of alleged ethical violations, to 
attempt to resolve the complaint, to dismiss those complaints 
determined to be frivolous, unintelligible, or unsupported by 
fact or which do not raise the possibility of any unprofessional 
conduct, and to refer cases to screening panel for resolution 
(See, Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Rule 
VIII). 
The Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar 
further provide for a review of disciplinary complaints by 
screening panels of the Ethics and Discipline Committee after 
the initial investigation by the Office of Bar Counsel. If 
warranted, the matter may then go before a disciplinary hearing 
panel for further consideration. At every stage, the Procedures 
of Discipline provide that the attorney be given adequate notice 
and full opportunity to be heard and to present his or her 
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defense. If the hearing before the disciplinary hearing panel 
results in a recommendation by the Board of Commissioners of 
disbarment, suspension, probation, or public reprimand, the 
attorney is first given opportunity to petition the Board to 
amend, modify, or reconsider the recommendation and then given 
opportunity to appeal the Board1s determination to the Utah 
Supreme Court. These procedures comply amply with the 
requirements of due process. 
Those due process requirements have been stated as 
follows: 
In depriving a person of life, liberty, or 
property, the essentials of due process 
are: (1) the existence of an appropriate 
tribunal; (2) inquiry into the merits of 
the question presented; (3) notice of the 
purpose of the inquiry; (4) opportunity to 
appear in person or by counsel; (5) fair 
opportunity to be heard; and, (6) judgment 
rendered in the record thus made. 
State In The Interest Of L.G.W., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). 
The accompanying affidavits indicate that at the time 
plaintiff requested the names of the screening panel members, 
the screening panel to which plaintifffs matter would be 
assigned had not yet been identified. Sutliff, therefore, was 
not capable of revealing that information to plaintiff at that 
time. The affidavits also indicate that that information, when 
known, would have been made available and will be made available 
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to plaintiff on the same basis that it is made known to any 
other attorney requesting it. 
Even assuming, however, that the Office of Bar Counsel 
refused to disclose that information to plaintiff, such would 
not constitute a violation of due process. The procedure 
followed by the Office of Bar Counsel and the procedure which 
will yet be followed pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline 
ensure that plaintiff has been and will be accorded all the 
elements of due process as set forth in L.G.W., above. There is 
simply no basis whatsoever for plaintifffs claim of a 
deprivation of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully 
request the court to dismiss plaintifffs complaint.-
DATED this ff^ day of September, 1989. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
rkmM E. KIPP 
ROBERT H. REES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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